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I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
This case involves allegations of medical practice against Defendant St. Luke's Magic 
Valley Regional Medical Center, Ltd. (hereinafter, "St. Luke's"). St. Luke's admitted negligence 
and causation, prior to trial. The issues at trial were recklessness and damages. There is no dispute 
in this case that Mrs. Herrett's injuries as a result of the stroke were debilitating such that she 
needs at least 12 hours a day in-home care for the rest of her life. 
B. Statement of Facts 
Mr. Rodney Herrett and Mrs. Joyce Herrett ( collectively, "the Herretts") were married in 
1984. Tr. p. 226, LL. 21-25. Together they raised a family of eight children. Tr. p. 227, LL. 1-4. 
They also have fifteen grandchildren and two great-grandchildren. Tr. p. 227, LL. 5-7. 
Due to previous cervical cancer and radiation treatments, Mrs. Herrett lost her bladder, 
colon, and uterus. Tr. p. 411, LL. 14-24. As a result, she had an ileostomy and a urostomy for 
more than 20 years prior to the stroke. Tr. p. 372, LL. 3-6; p. 412, LL. 5-17. Up until she suffered 
the stroke at St. Luke's she could independently and privately care for and maintain her ostomies 
without the assistance of others. Tr. p. 412, LL. 19-25. 
Despite her ostomies and other conditions, Mrs. He1Tett was able to lead an independent 
and family-oriented life. Tr. p. 370, LL. 1-25. She worked and drove a car. Tr. p. 371, LL. 19-22. 
She was known to be a voracious reader. Tr. p. 371, LL. 1-5. She and her husband enjoyed 
camping and traveling. Tr. p. 371, LL. 13-25; p. 372, LL. 1-2. She regularly babysat her 
grandchildren without assistance from others. Tr. p. 371, LL 15-18. In fact, Mrs. Herrett was able 
to care for her 18-month old granddaughter for four to six hours a day prior to this stroke. Tr. p. 
329, LL. 2-8. 
In December 2013, Mrs. Herrett was admitted to St. Luke's Magic Valley due to infection 
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and sepsis. Tr. p. 230, LL. 17-20. On December 24, 2013, Mrs. Herrett had nearly completely 
recovered and was to be discharged home. Tr. p. 230, L. 23 -p. 231, L. 3. 
At the time of discharge from St. Luke's Magic Valley, Mrs. Herrett was dressed, had her 
coat on, and was sitting in a wheelchair ready to leave the hospital. Id. Mrs. Herrett, however, 
still had a central venous catheter ("CVC") placed in her neck at this time. Tr. p. 231, LL. 5-11. 
The central venous catheter had been inserted into Mrs. Herrett' s jugular vein and sutured to the 
skin of her neck. Tr. p. 506, LL. 10-25. 
Mr. Herrett informed Nurse Wentz that the CVC was still in place. Tr. p. 231, LL. 5-11. 
She left the room and called Mrs. Herrett's physician, Dr. Kim Cheri Wiggins (hereinafter, "Dr. 
Wiggins") for direction. Tr. p. 437, LL. 8-17. Dr. Wiggins ordered that the central venous 
catheter be removed prior to discharge. Tr. p. 437, LL. 18-20. 
Nurse Wentz had never removed a CVC prior to this date. Tr. p. 438, LL. 9-12. She 
testified that she informed a co-worker, Nurse Sheila Dutt, that she had never performed this 
procedure and asked for assistance. Tr. p. 439, LL. 11-17. Nurse Wentz stated that Nurse Dutt 
stated, "just go ahead and pull it out slowly." Tr. p. 439, LL. 23-24. Nurse Dutt denied that Nurse 
Wentz asked for assistance. Tr. p. 493, LL. 14-19. 
St. Luke's had a policy for removing a CVC. Exh. FF. Nurse Wentz was aware of the 
policy but had never reviewed it. Tr. p. 440, LL. 10-24. Removing a CVC is a known high risk 
procedure that can cause an air embolism or stroke if done improperly. Tr. p. 488, LL. 1-9. 
There is no dispute that Nurse Wentz violated the hospital policy when she attempted to 
remove the CVC while Mrs. Herrett was sitting up. 1 Tr. p. 232, LL. 12-13. As the central line 
was removed, Mrs. Herrett became very anxious and began having difficulty breathing. Tr. p. 
232, LL. 19-24. She then started to convulse as her eyes rolled back into her head. Tr. p. 233, LL. 
1 The proper procedure involved laying the patient flat and instructing them to hold their breath. 
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7-10. Mrs. Hen-ett became totally unresponsive and a rapid response team was called. Tr. p. 233, 
LL. 10-25. A CT scan was performed that confirmed Mrs. Hen-ett had suffered a stroke caused 
by an air embolism. Tr. p. 587, L. 23 -p. 588, L. 3. 
As a result of the stroke, Mrs. Hen-ett suffered severe physical and mental damage. Tr. p. 
589, LL. 1-19. She was densely hemiparetic and extremely weak on her right side. Id. Mrs. 
Hen-ett also had severe expressive aphasia and difficulty swallowing. Id. Additionally, Mrs. 
Hen-ett developed nearly crippling anxiety. Id. 
Mrs. He1Tett was hospitalized as a result of the stroke. Tr. p. 588, LL. 16-19; Tr. p. 589, 
LL. 7 - p. 590, L. 2. She had to re-learn the alphabet. Tr. p. 918, LL. 19-21. She had to learn how 
to walk again. Tr. p. 919, LL. 2-3. She had to re-learn to swallow. Tr. p. 918, LL. 24-25. Mrs. 
Berrett continued to see Dr. Wiggins on an outpatient basis as she continued her therapies. Tr. p. 
590, LL. 15 -p. 591, LL. I. 
On June 29, 2014, Mrs. Hen-ett was examined by neuropsychologist Dr. Calhoun. Tr. p. 
332, LL. 3-22. Dr. Calhoun works at St. Alphonsus Regional Medical Center as the director of 
brain injury and stroke rehabilitation. Id. Dr. Calhoun diagnosed Mrs. He1Tett with moderate 
expressive language dysfunction inhibiting her ability to concentrate and keep her attention. Tr. 
p. 339, LL. 15-24. Also, she had moderate expressive aphasias as well as dysarthric ("slun-ed") 
speech. Tr. p. 341, LL. 17-22. Significantly, Mrs. Hen-ett was suffering from anxiety related to 
the stroke. Tr. p. 341, LL. 23-25. Dr. Calhoun attributed this to her loss of brain function, her 
inability to function independently, and inability to care for herself. Tr. p. 342, LL. 13-19. 
With respect to Mrs. Hen-ett's activities of daily living ("ADLs") such as the ability to get 
up, brush her teeth, shower, and eat, Dr. Calhoun found that Mrs. Hen-ett required ongoing 
assistance. Tr. p. 345, LL. 21 - p. 346, LL. 1-8. With respect to her ostomies, Dr. Calhoun 
recommended she have 24 hour assistance Tr. p. 347, LL. 11 -p. 348, LL. 14; Exh. 37; 38. 
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In the fall of 2014, Mrs. Herrett was readmitted to the hospital. Tr. p. 591, LL. 2-14. Mrs. 
Herre!! was suffering from dehydration and severe anxiety. Tr. p. 591, LL. 19-25. She also had 
weight loss, functional decline and poor intake. Tr. p. 594, LL. 19-25. She has permanent 
contractures of her right arm and wrist. Tr. p. 665, L. 20 - p. 666, L. 10. Her gait is unsteady, 
placing her at a high fall risk. Id. She has difficulty in activities of daily living such as showering, 
dressing and grooming. Id. Mrs. Herrett also suffered vision changes, including double-vision, as 
a result of the stroke. Tr. p. 673, LL. 11-16. She continues to suffer from agitation, irritability, 
depression and anxiety as a result of the stroke. Tr. p. 679, LL. 21 - p. 680, LL. 11. She can no 
longer drive. Tr. p. 249, LL. 2-7. 
As a result of the stroke, Mrs. Herrett also lost the ability to care independently for her 
ostomies. She lost physical sensation allowing her to detect when her ileostomy and urostomy 
where filling or full. Id.; Tr. p. 413, LL. 8-17. Due to the contractures of her aim and wrist and 
cognitive deficits, she is now unable to empty those bags independently. Id. 
Mrs. Herrett cannot be left home alone for any significant ainount of time. Tr. p. 690, LL. 
17 - p. 691, LL. 6; Tr. p. 237, LL. 8-16. Given the severity of her cognitive and physical 
problems and inability to be independent, Mrs. Herrett requires in-home care. Tr. p. 692, LL. 2-
18. 
Much of the responsibility of caring for Mrs. Herrett, fell to her husband after the stroke. 
Tr. p. 237, LL. 17-20. Mr. Herrett helps change, maintain, and empty her ostomies. Tr. p. 237, 
LL. 17-20. The ostomy bags are typically emptied every hour to hour and a half. Tr. p., 244, LL. 
14-16. The bags and wafers also have to be regularly changed. Tr. p. 243, LL. 1-8. 
C. Course of Proceedings 
On February 9, 2015, Mr. and Mrs. Herrett filed a Complaint against St. Luke's for 
medical negligence. R. pp. 16-22. Prior to trial, St. Luke's admitted that the manner in which the 
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central venous catheter was removed violated the standard of care. R. pp. 392; 648; 998; 1175. 
St. Luke's further admitted that the breach of the standard of care caused Mrs. Herrett to suffer 
the stroke. Id. 
The jury trial in this matter began on June 27, 2016. R. p. 1187. The issues in dispute at 
trial were whether the conduct of Nurse Wentz was reckless, whether the September/October 
2014 admission was related to the stroke, and the amount of damages the Herretts were entitled 
to as a result of the conduct of St. Luke's. App. Brief, p. 5. The Herretts' nursing expert testified 
at trial that the conduct of St. Luke's was reckless. Tr. p. 520, LL. 1-16. St. Luke's, on the other 
hand, did not elicit testimony from any witness at trial that Nurse Wentz's conduct was not 
reckless-not even from Nurse Wentz herself. Tr. p. 493, LL. 3-13. In fact, St. Luke's employee 
Nurse Dutt testified that she would have expected a nurse who is unfamiliar with a procedure to 
review the policy before attempting it. Nurse Dutt agreed that it would have been "unthinkable" 
to allow a nurse who asked for help in removing a central venous catheter to attempt the 
procedure without the requested assistance. Tr. p. 494, LL. 3-7. 
Regarding the September/October 2014 admission to the hospital, Mrs. Herrett's treating 
physician Dr. Wiggins testified that the stroke was a substantial contributing factor to that 
admission. Tr. p. 598, LL. 7-19. Dr. Wiggins practiced at St. Luke's Magic Valley as a physiatrist 
specializing in rehabilitation of patients who have suffered problems such as brain injuries, spinal 
cord injuries and strokes. Tr. p. 576, LL. 10 - p. 578, LL. 21. 
St. Luke's does not deny that the remaining $327,520.47 in medical bills were related to 
the stroke. The Herretts provided substantial evidence that Mrs. Herrett was entitled to in-home 
care twenty four hours a day, seven days a week. Tr. p. 692, LL. 7-18. The Herretts' life care 
planner opined that the in-home care would cost $377.50 per day or about $15.73 per hour. Tr. p. 
694, LL. 4-12. 
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St. Luke's does not dispute that Mrs. Berrett requires a certain level of in-home care. An 
expert witness for St. Luke's, Dr. Rodde Cox, testified he believed that Mrs. BeITett required 
care for twelve hours a day, seven days a week. Tr. p. 893, LL. 19-25; p. 894, LL. 1-14. The 
costing expert for St. Luke's, Ms. Dunlap, valued that care at $18.00 an hour. Tr. p. 1054, LL. 5-
12. 
For life expectancy and duration of the plan, Ms. Dunlap testified that she utilized Dr. 
Cox's rep01i for medical foundation. Tr. p. 1057, LL. 2-10. After the stroke, Dr. Cox indicated in 
his report that he felt "her life expectancy would be roughly 10 years or less." Tr. p. 1057, L. 16-
p. 1058, L. 1. Dr. Cox opined that, prior to the stroke, Mrs. Berrett's life expectancy was 10 -15 
years. Id. In other words, St. Luke's own expert believed that the stroke cost Mrs. Berrett roughly 
five years of life. Id. Despite these opinions, Ms. Dunlap indicated that she "was asked to use 
five years" for the duration of her costing analysis even before Dr. Cox's report was finished. Tr. 
p. 1058, LL. 4-15. 
At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict finding that the conduct in 
question was reckless, that the stroke was a substantial contributing factor in the September 2014 
admission, and that Berretts were entitled to $3,850,004.83 in total damages. R. pp. 1160-1169. 
That award consisted of $94,484.86 for the disputed September 2014 admission; $1,400,000 of 
future medical expenses and in-home care; $178,000 for home modifications; $1,500,000 in non-
economic damages to Plaintiff Joyce Berrett; and $350,000 in non-economic damages to Plaintiff 
Rodney Berrett. R. pp. 1160-1169. The verdict was reduced by stipulation to reflect contractual 
adjustments of medical expenses and an amended judgment was entered for $3,775,864.21. R. p. 
319. St. Luke's then initiated this appeal. R. pp. 1201-1206. 
II. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The Herretts Rephrase the Issues on Appeal as: 
A. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by overruling St. Luke's objection to Dr. 
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Wiggins' testimony where she was disclosed as a treating physician, the 
encephalomalacia diagnosis was contained in the medical records introduced into 
evidence by St. Luke's, and the issue was first raised during cross-examination? 
B. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion in denying St. Luke's Motion for Mistrial where it 
found encephalomalacia had been properly disclosed and to the extent the jury might 
have misunderstood the testimony to mean Mrs. Berrett had a "continuing" or ongoing 
stroke, St. Luke's was allowed to rebut that misunderstanding with its own physician 
expert and also stipulated to instruct the jury that it is a fact that Mrs. Berrett does not 
have continuing brain deterioration? 
C. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by allowing the Berretts' expert witness to testify 
in rebuttal about a learned treatise that St. Luke's expert discussed on direct testimony 
after hearing an offer of proof and limiting the testimony? 
D. Did the reckless instruction given by the Trial Court correctly set forth the law under the 
circumstances of this case where it followed the objective standard set forth in Henne fer 
and St. Luke's stipulated to not instructing the jury on negligence? 
E. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion by allowing the Berretts' life care expert to testify 
after she provided significant foundation with respect to her training as a registered nurse, 
manager of the VA rehab clinic, educational qualifications, review of the medical records, 
discussion with a treating physician and in-home evaluation of the Berretts? 
F. Did the admission of any of the evidence complained about on appeal violate a significant 
right of St. Luke's given the undisputed facts of this case or does it constitute harmless 
error? 
G. Should this Court award fees and costs under LC. § 12-121 because St. Luke's appeal is 
frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation? 
III. ARGUMENT 
A. Summary of Argument 
This is a lawsuit by a patient who complains that a nurse at St. Luke's hospital recklessly 
caused a stroke and resulting permanent brain damage by removing a central venous catheter 
(CVC). The nurse had never performed a CVC removal before, didn't bother to read the hospital 
protocol that outlined safety precautions that must be taken, knew she could cause a stroke or 
even death, but did it anyway without following the protocol or obtaining help. There was 
conflicting testimony by St. Luke's nurses on whether help was asked for and refused. St. Luke's 
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admitted that the nurse breached the applicable standard of care, but denied that the conduct 
constituted recklessness. St. Luke's also admitted that the breach of the standard of care by the 
nurse caused a catastrophic stroke and that the injury was permanently disabling. 
At trial there was no dispute that the stroke required months of rehabilitation and 
hospitalization costing $327,248.07. Tr. p. 254, LL. 17-18; Exh. 100. There was no dispute that 
Mrs. Herrett needs in-home care for the rest of her life for at least 12 hours a day. The proof was 
undisputed that, due to the stroke, Mrs. Herrett cannot read any more, cannot be left alone, 
cannot drive a car, has difficulty remembering things and speaking, and is permanently paralyzed 
on the upper part of her body. 
Not surprisingly, after hearing all of this the jury found the conduct of the nurse was 
reckless and awarded the Herretts a total of$3,850,004.83 in total damages. R. pp. 1160-1169. 
St. Luke's appeals this verdict on four grounds - none of which have any merit. St. Luke's 
argues that the Trial Court should have granted a mistrial because a treating doctor was allowed 
to testify about previously undisclosed details of the stroke injury. The opinions regarding the 
details of the injury, encephalomalacia, were introduced into evidence by St. Luke's during cross 
examination of the treating physician. St. Luke's opened the door by putting into evidence these 
medical records and drawing attention on cross examination to only part of them. The Trial Court 
used its sound discretion in allowing the witness to fully explain her answers on re-direct 
examination pursuant to Idaho rules. Furthermore, any prejudice was cured when the parties 
stipulated to an instruction to the jury on that issue. 
St. Luke's contends that an expert witness's opinions on rebuttal regarding life 
expectancy were not properly disclosed. In fact, a detailed disclosure was given by the Plaintiffs 
and the testimony on rebuttal was very limited and was heard by the trial judge outside the 
presence of the jury before it was put into evidence. The opinions of Dr. Goldstein could not 
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have been a surprise to St. Luke's and St. Luke's fails to point to any prejudice or violation of a 
substantial right due to the admission of the evidence. 
St. Luke's claims reversible error because of the jury instruction on the definition of 
reckless misconduct on the grounds that the instruction is not identical to the IDJI instruction. 
The instruction as given is a correct statement of the law and conforms to recent Idaho case law. 
Regardless, the evidence of recklessness is overwhelming and St. Luke's again fails to 
demonstrate any prejudice given that a contrary finding could not possibly be supported by 
substantial evidence. 
Finally, St. Luke's argues that it is entitled to a new trial because the Herretts' life care 
planner did not have the proper foundation for her opinions on future care. St. Luke's fails to 
identify what part of the opinion lacks the requisite medical foundation, ignores the substantial 
qualifications of the expert witness and ignores the mountain of undisputed evidence regarding 
the need for future care. These evidentiary rulings and the denial of the motion for mistrial were 
matters determined in the exercise of discretion by the Trial Court. This is a frivolous appeal, and 
the Herretts are entitled to attorney's fees. 
B. The Trial Court properly denied St. Luke's Motion for Mistrial based on the 
applicable legal standards, the underlying facts, and applying reason 
This issue on appeal raises the question of whether or not the lower Court acted within its 
discretion when it denied St. Luke's motion for a mistrial. Despite repeated arguments to the 
contrary, the trial judge demonstrably understood the correct legal standards to be applied and 
used reason to conclude that St. Luke's could receive a fair trial. In its brief, St. Luke's 
repeatedly mischaracterizes the evidence and record below, demonstrates absolutely no prejudice 
or that a substantial right was violated, and does nothing more than ask this Court to second 
guess the Trial Court's discretionary decision. 
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1. The standard of review is abuse of discretion 
Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 47(u) governs the consideration of motions for mistrial and 
states as follows "Declaration of mistrial - Sanctions. After trial is commenced, at any time prior 
to the rendering of a verdict, the court on its own motion or upon motion of any party may 
declare a mistrial ifit determines an occun-ence at trial has prevented a fair trial." LR.C.P. 47(u). 
The decision to grant a mistrial is left to the sound discretion of the trial court and "[t]he 
burden is on the person asserting en-or to show an abuse of discretion." Ballard v. Kerr, 160 
Idaho 674, 697, 378 P.3d 464,487 (2016), citing Merrill v. Gibson, 139 Idaho 840, 843, 87 P.3d 
949, 952 (2004). "When determining whether a district court abused its discretion, this Comi 
considers three factors: (1) whether the trial court correctly perceived the issue as one of 
discretion, (2) whether it acted within the boundaries of its discretion and consistently with 
applicable legal principles, and (3) whether it reached its decision through an exercise ofreason." 
Edmunds v. Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 873, 136 P.3d 338, 344 (2006), citing Lamar Corp. v. City of 
Twin Falls, 133 Idaho 36, 40,981 P.2d 1146, 1150 (1999). 
2. St. Luke's fails to demonstrate that it was deprived of a fair trial in this case 
because of the Court's refusal to grant a mistrial 
a. The Court correctly allowed Dr. Wiggins' redirect testimony regarding 
encephalomalacia given the narrow issue of relatedness of St. Luke's 
bills to the Herrettsfor the September 2014 hospital admission 
Dr. Wiggins was a St. Luke's employee who treated Mrs. Hen-ett. She disclosed was 
disclosed as a treating physician who would testify consistent with the medical records and her 
treatment pursuant to LR.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii). This disclosure specifically included the fact that 
she was expected to testify that "the treatment provided as a result of the stroke was reasonable 
and necessruy and that the improper removal of the CVC was a substantial contributing factor in 
causing the injury." R. p. 66. 
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At trial, the issues had been significantly narrowed and included whether $94,484.36 in 
expenses related to the post-stroke treatment and rehabilitation at St. Lukes in September 2014 
was caused by the stroke. The Berretts maintain that even a cursory review of the medical 
records from the September hospitalization made it evident that the hospital admission was 
related to the stroke event. Also, there is no dispute in this case that all of the medical records 
from St. Luke's, including those specifically prepared by Dr. Wiggins, were in the possession of 
St. Luke's long before the trial began in 2016. 
Dr. Wiggins was called to testify during the Berrett' s case in chief. The primary focus of 
her testimony on direct was whether her decision to admit Joyce Berrett to St. Luke's in 
September of 2014 was related to the stroke she suffered in December 2013 - as reflected in her 
notes. During her direct examination, Dr. Wiggins reviewed the medical records from her 
treatment of Joyce Berrett in September and, citing the 'chief complaint' documented in the 
record, definitively linked the need for the hospital admission to the stroke. Tr. p. 595, LL. 14 -
p. 596, LL. 5. 
This testimony was not objected to during the course of the proceedings below and, as St. 
Luke's points out in its appeal, no mention was made of encephalomalacia. 
b. St. Luke's attempted to put its damages defense on through cross-
examination of its own treating physician, and it backfired 
St. Lnke's counsel cross-examined Dr. Wiggins on a myriad of subjects including other 
diagnoses or conditions notated in the hospital records that were potentially not related to the 
stroke. Tr. pp. 626, LL. 4-24. During this cross examination, St. Luke's introduced several 
exhibits into the record including Defendant's Land K. Tr. p. 622, LL. 10-20. St. Luke's, by its 
own admission, sought to use the records in conjunction with Dr. Wiggins' testimony to try and 
convince the jury that some unrelated medical condition of Mrs. Berrett precipitated the need to 
be hospitalized rather than the stroke. App. Brief, p. 14. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 11 
St. Luke's, at its peril, sought to cherry-pick the medical records to get Dr. Wiggins to 
agree that the stroke St. Luke's caused was not a substantial contributing factor to her 
hospitalization in September 2014. In short, St. Luke's attempted to put on their defense 
regarding these damages by cross examining one of their own treating physicians - and it 
backfired. 
On redirect examination, counsel for the Herretts asked about imaging studies that were 
reviewed by Dr. Wiggins. Tr. p. 627, LL. 22 - p. 628, LL. 2. Dr. Wiggins used the word 
"encephalomalacia" when discussing the CT findings at the site of the sh·oke. Tr. p. 628, LL. 3-4. 
Dr. Wiggins explained that encephalomalacia is the "softening of the brain tissue" that typically 
happens in the area of the brain that has been damaged. Tr. p. 628, LL. 10-12. St. Luke's objected 
to this testimony arguing that encephalomalacia was undisclosed. Tr. p. 628, LL. 13-15. 
The Trial Court heard argument outside the presence of the jury and, after considering the 
issue, allowed the witness to testify holding that encephalomalacia had been properly disclosed. 
Tr. p. 633, LL. 25 - p. 634, LL. 1-14. Specifically, the Trial Court found that the offered 
testimony was consistent with the medical records. The Trial Court recognized that Dr. Wiggins 
was a treating physician pursuant to I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4)(A)(ii)2 and stated: 
Obviously we have a huge amount of medical records in this case. Also very 
obvious to the Court that these records have been dissected, redissected, and 
redissected by everybody, and it's what the examination has shown the witnesses 
so far. So the statement made by Dr. Wiggins about this EKG is in this record. 
There's no dispute about that. That's been disclosed. I'm going to find within my 
discretion that this is properly disclosed .... 
2 That Rule sets forth the requirement that a disclosure ofa non-retained expert requires "a statement of the subject 
matter in which the witness is expected to present evidence" ... "and a summary of the facts and opinions to which 
the witness is expected to testify." 
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Tr. p. 634, LL. 3-14. 
Not until the Trial Court ruled in their favor on this issue did the Herretts continue with 
redirect examination. On appeal, St. Lukes argues that the Trial Court found that counsel for the 
Herretts "violated" the Comi' s Order in limine with respect to pretrial expert disclosures. App. 
Brief, p. 10. There is no basis to justify the argument that the Court found that the Herretts 
violated any Court orders or discovery rules in the record. 
The Court allowed the witness to proceed after specifically pointing out that the 
encephalomalacia was already in the record and had been properly disclosed under 
26(b )( 4)(A)(ii). Continued colloquy with Dr. Wiggins was concluded and the Court made the 
following additions to the record after the jury was excused and specifically addressed whether 
he thought there was any prejudice to St. Luke's as a result: 
I want to make -- supplement this record as to my ruling as to the reason for 
allowing testimony concerning the EKG and the brain softening Dr. Wiggins 
testified about. I understand the argument that there is no clear statement in that 
this opinion was disclosed in terms of the disclosure statements that are filed. I 
understand that. I do not see that that revelation of information to the jury is 
prejudicial in this case, and the reason for that is this: There is no question --
there is no question in this case that Mrs. Herrett had a stroke. I'm not, certainly, 
an expe1i on brain injuries, but my common sense, education, and knowledge of 
this whole area is that's exactly what you would expect to see, some deterioration 
of the brain, from a physical standpoint. That's what strokes do. I can't say that 
would be surprising to anybody to see that. 
Tr. p. 643, LL. 24-25; p. 644, LL. 1-16 (emphasis added). There is nothing in this statement by 
the Court that indicates it misunderstood the legal standards to be applied with respect to the 
admission of the testimony - just the opposite. 
c. The Trial Court correctly refused to grant a mistrial because St. Luke's 
did not demonstrate that it could not get a fair trial because Dr. 
Wiggins' brought up the undisputed diagnosis of encephalomalacia 
On July 5, 2016, St. Luke's brought a Motion for Mistrial based on the prior admission of 
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Dr. Wiggins' testimony regarding encephalomalacia during trial on July I. Tr. p. 772, LL. 9-18. 
St. Luke's argues on appeal that the Trial Court applied an incorrect legal standard when 
considering the motion for mistrial. 3 
During the hearing on the motion, the Trial Court stated: "A motion for mistrial is a 
discretionary call on the part of the Court. I don't think there is really any dispute as to the law 
with regard to mistrial motion, as cited in both of the briefs." Tr. p. 79, LL. 11-14. After quoting 
the Rule 4 7, the court went on to say: 
So that is the standard that I have to operate with. As I said, I understand this is a 
discretionary call, and it is a discretionary call because the rule uses the word 
"may" as opposed to shall. The well known standard for evaluating the Court's 
discretion is that I have to recognize that I do have discretion. I have to recognize 
the parameters of that discretion, and I have to hopefully make a reasoned 
decision as to which way I go. 
Tr. p. 791, LL. 18-25. 
Contrary to St. Luke's assertions in its brief, the Court at no time during the proceedings 
below ruled that the encephalomalacia had not been properly disclosed. The issue, as recognized 
by the Trial Court, was really whether Dr. Wiggins' characterization of encephalomalacia, after 
the initial objection, may have added some unexpected dimension to the diagnosis with respect 
3 In arguing that encephalomalacia should have been specifically disclosed by the Herretts through an expert (beyond 
the content of the medical record), St. Luke's asserts that: 
If the Herretts believed that testimony about continuing brain deterioration may be needed to show 
a causal connection between the December injury and the September 2014 hospitalization, they 
could and should have properly disclosed such an expert opinion, from Dr. Wiggins or another 
expert. A party does 110/ waive the right to pretrial disclosure of expert testi111011y by q11estio11i11g 
witnesses about issues. 
App. Brief, pp. 17-18 (emphasis added). This argument underscores the frivolous nature of this issue on appeal. 
Without even addressing the differences between a paid expert and a treating physician that was working for the 
defendant, the suggestion that the only proof of a connection between the September hospitalization and the stroke is 
the encephalomalacia is absurd and amounts to cherry-picking the record. It also suggests that on cross-examination 
a party should be allowed to ask any questions it wants without fear of being corrected on redirect. It ignores the 
abundant facts already part of the record that supported the causal connection between the stroke and the 
hospitalization. It begs the question of whether the Herretts should have anticipated that St. Luke's would be so 
ignorant of the content of its own hospital records that a specific, separate reference to each and every medical 
iagnosis or "chief complaint" be disclosed through a treating physician beyond the records themselves. This 
argument is absurd. 
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to it being a "progressive type of stroke." 
The issue here is not, in my view, so much the testimony about the softening of 
the brain. I already ruled on that, and I said I thought that was fairly disclosed. I 
thought it was within the scope of the medical records. I thought that you -- and I 
agree with what [Mr. Whitehead is J saying -- is that that was certainly the tenor of 
the cross-examination to show that there was lots of reasons why Mrs. Herrett was 
having these problems in September and October beyond the stroke. I don't think 
there's any question about that. The problem that we really need to focus on is the 
question that led to Dr. Wiggins making the statement that it's a progressive type 
of stroke. 
Tr. p. 785, LL. 9-22. 
It is clear from the Court's discussion above that the only issue it thought needed 
addressed was something that Dr. Wiggins volunteered during her testimony. The Trial Court 
exercised its discretion in denying the motion for mistrial and allowed St. Luke's to discuss the 
encephalomalacia with its own expert on the witness stand and also gave an instruction to the 
Jury. 
d. St. Luke's misstates the Court's findings and cites to cases that are 
inapposite a11d bear 110 factual similarity to this case with respect to the 
admission of expert testimony 
St. Luke's argument, at its heart, is that the Trial Court abused its discretion because 
I.R.C.P 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) required the Herretts to disclose that Dr. Wiggins would talk about 
encephalomalacia prior to trial, it was not contained in the written disclosure, and the Court 
allowed it anyway. To support this argument, St. Luke's draws upon cases such as Edmunds v. 
Kraner, 142 Idaho 867, 136 P.3d 338 (2006) and Radmer v. Ford Motor Co., 120 Idaho 86, 813 
P.2d 897 (1991). The problem with St. Luke's argument is the facts underlying these cases and 
the rationale asserted for reversing the lower court's discretionary decisions regarding paid expert 
testimony are completely inapposite to this case. St. Luke's argument also completely misstates 
the record in this case with respect to whether there was even a failure to disclose. 
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In Edmunds, the lower court struck plaintiffs' medical expert testimony and then granted 
summary judgment. 142 Idaho 867, 875, 136 P.3d 338, 346 (2006). The Supreme Court reversed 
the decision to strike expert testimony stating that, among other things, the Court "ignored that 
Idaho law and rules of civil procedure contemplate that expert opinions can change and develop 
during the course of litigation. . . . Moreover, this decision was based on an incorrect 
understanding of discovery procedure." Id. 
In Radmer, the trial court allowed an expert to testify, over objection, concerning a 
physical examination performed a few days before trial that was undisclosed and offered brand-
new opinions concerning the cause of an accident that were contradictory to the opinions 
previously disclosed. 120 Idaho 86, 88, 813 P.2d 897, 899 (1991). Neither of those situations 
apply here. This is an undisputed liability case with significant damages. The specific diagnosis 
being complained about was scattered throughout the medical record and was being referenced 
by St. Luke's own treating physician. Contrary to the arguments from St. Luke's, the record is 
clear that the Trial Court understood the correct standard for considering a mistrial. 
e. St. Luke's cannot claim surprise or prejudice because diagnosis of 
enceplzalomalacia and tlze fact tlzat it was caused by tlze stroke is an 
undisputed medical fact 
There is no dispute in this case that Mrs. Berrett was diagnosed by physicians working for 
St. Luke's as having encephalomalacia and that it was as a result of the stoke. The diagnosis 
appears all over the medical records used by both sides in this case. St. Luke's argument, inter 
alia, that it is the addition of the words 'continuing' or 'progressive' that somehow pushes Dr. 
Wiggins' redirect testimony into the objectionable realm falls flat for similar reasons. App. Brief, 
pp. 18-21. 
Taken as a whole, Dr. Wiggins accurately described the diagnosis in the records. She 
testified that: 
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Encephalomalacia's basically a seconda1y complication. So you have an area that's 
injured, and the tissue dies, and then what happens with the brain tissue as it 
softens, it kind of starts breaking up, basically kind of turns to mush. So that's a 
secondary event after an injury such as the stroke. So you don't see 
encephalomalacia without something causing it. 
Tr. p. 635, LL. 12-21. Dr. Wiggins also explained: 
Everybody's brain is different, but the fact that we saw -- that you see continued 
deterioration of her brai11 is very wonisome for damaging not only that area but 
areas around it as well. So basically there are areas that are changing. 
*** 
Well, it shows that her brain was continuing to deteriorate, so she had the stroke, 
and that was the one-time injury to her brain, but the area that was damaged 
continued to change over time, so I think that that fits with the clinical picture 
that we saw, the deterioration. 
Tr. p. 635, LL. 21 - 636, LL. 18 (emphasis added). 
The CT report referenced in Exhibits K and L was also in the trial record prior to Dr. 
Wiggins' testimony on redirect. Exh. 5, SLMV5214-15. This report uses the same verbiage about 
'progression' and 'changes' as Dr. Wiggins with respect to the encephalomalacia: 
Progressio11 of encep/zalomalacia involving the left frontal and adjacent parietal 
region as seen on the CT of December 25, 2013 and MRI report of December 27, 
2013. 
*** 
Impression: Encep/zalomalacia cha11ges involving mostly the left frontal lobe 
region, c01Telating to the area of previous venous gas distribution and area venous 
infarct. 
Ex. 5, SLMV5214 (emphasis added). 
f. St. Luke's cannot claim surprise or prejudice because it first i11troduced 
the evide11ce oft/ze e11cephalomalacia to the jury through Defe11se 
Exhibits Kand L duri11g the cross-exami11atio11 of Dr. Wiggi11s 
St. Luke's, in support of its cross examination, introduced and then referenced medical 
records in Defense Exhibits K and L. Tr. p. 621. From the very start of the cross examination, 
counsel for St. Luke's asked Dr. Wiggins about the records contained in the exhibits and whether 
she agrees with the assessments therein. Id. The approach was obviously intended to challenge 
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Dr. Wiggins' testimony elicited on direct. 
The problem for St. Luke's with its cross-examination strategy is that its own records 
reflect that the "chief complaint" for the admission was "stroke." Exh. 5, p. SLMV5223. The 
portions of the records contained in Exhibits K and L are also replete with references to the 
encephalomalacia diagnosis. In fact, the encephalomalacia is a major component of Mrs. 
He1Tett's treatment at St. Luke's during the September 2014 admission and mentioned in almost 
every hospital physician's note, including Dr. Wiggins'. Exh. 5, SLMV5214. 
For example, St. Luke's Exhibit K, referenced in the portion of the transcript cited above, 
mentions the diagnosis in three separate inpatient progress notes by Dr. Timothy Enders. "The 
patient also has encep/zalomalacia in the left frontal lobe region as a result of her unfortunate air 
embolic stroke." Exh. K, p. 20 (emphasis added). " ... [l]eft frontal encep/zalomalacia according 
to her most recent CT scan." Id. (emphasis added). 
Unmentioned by St. Luke's in this appeal is that Dr. Ender's notes in Exhibit K also 
specifically discusses the encephalomalacia in relation to her stroke and the metabolic 
encephalopathy brought up by St. Luke's counsel on cross examination.4 The note reads: 
ASSESSMENT AND PLAN 
1. Metabolic encephalopathy. This is improved to grade 1. The patient is awake 
and alert to person, place and time; however, she is having some psychotic 
4 
In fact, the very first 'alternative diagnosis' raised in the cross exam is, according to the exhibit, related to the 
stroke as well: 
BY MS. FOUSER: 
Q. So if we start with Kl 7, there's another doctor who was caring for her, Dr. Timothy 
Enders, correct? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. And if we look through his assessments when she was in the hospital, he thought she had 
metabolic -- one of the assessments was metabolic encephalopathy, correct? 
A. That's what he's saying. 
Q. Okay. And then -- so it was potentially multifactorial, correct? 
A. Yes, ma'am. 
Q. Okay. So there could be a lot of reasons that she's there, there could be several reasons 
that she's having the symptoms that she's having, fair? 
A. Yes, ma'am.( ... ) 
Tr. p. 622, LL. 22 - p. 623, LL IO. 
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features. Tlzis is likely related to lzer frontotemporal stroke .... 
*** 
5. Cerebrovascular accident with residual right sided hemiparesis and spasticity. 
The patient has left frontal enceplzalomalacia according to her most recent CT 
scan. Tlzis enceplzalomalacia is likely tlze major contributor to # 1. 
Exh. K, p. 22 (emphasis added). 
Dr. Ender's transfer summary, also part of Exhibit K, supports Dr. Wiggins and states: 
PROCEDURES: The patient has a CT of the head obtained on 09/14/14 slzowing 
enceplzalomalacia clzanges involving mostly the left frontal lobe region, 
con-elating to the area of previous venous gas distribution and area of venous 
infarct. No associated new parenchymal hemonhage. No new areas of 
encephalomalacia or edema. No hydrocephalus or midline shift. 
*** 
HOSPITAL COURSE: ... The patient was admitted as a result of mental status 
changes and weight loss. . . . Unfortunately, the patient has developed some 
paranoid type of delusions. There is concern tlzat this correlates witlz tlze 
encephalomalacia located at the left frontal lobe region. 
Exh. K, p. 24 (emphasis added). The same is true for St. Luke's Exhibit L which contains 
physician evaluations by another St. Luke's physiatrist, Jonathan Myers. On the very first page it 
states: 
The head CT showed encephalomalacia of the left frontal lobe but no new 
hemonhages and no new areas of edema or acute stroke. She was seen in 
consultation by Dr. Wiggins over the weekend, who felt that she wananted 
admission to acute inpatient rehabilitation. 
Exh. L, p. 1 ( emphasis added). 
The encephalomalacia diagnosis is found again and again in separate notes by Dr. Myers 
contained in Exhibit L. Exh. L, p. 29, p. 38, p. 31. However, these portions of the exhibit and that 
diagnosis were not highlighted or asked about during the cross-examination of Dr. Wiggins. St. 
Luke's is presumed to know the content of its own records. It was not reasonably anticipated that 
St. Luke's would attempt to argue its defense by ignoring the "chief complaint" or significance of 
"encephalomalacia" in the medical records it was using as support. When they did, it is axiomatic 
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that Dr. Wiggins should be allowed to defend her answers on redirect and only fitting that she 
used information in St. Luke's own records to do it. 
g. St. Luke's cannot claim unfair surprise or prejudice because it "opened 
the door" to this line of inquiry on cross-examination 
Even assuming arguendo that encephalomalacia was not properly disclosed as part of Dr. 
Wiggins' testimony, the Court is not precluded from allowing a witness to comment on the 
records introduced by St. Luke's - as it did in this case. "Although the principal is not set fo1ih in 
the rules of evidence, the proposition is generally accepted and frequently applied that a party 
cannot object to inadmissible matters where they are opened up by the objecting party. This 
principal is variously described as 'opening the door' or 'invited error."' Lewis, Craig D., IDAHO 
TRIAL HANDBOOK, p. 294 (1995). "The 'invited en-or' doctrine also applies where otherwise 
objectionable matter surfaces in response to counsel's own questions, and to matters offered to 
rebut in areas first opened up by one's opponent." Id. 
During its cross-examination of Dr. Wiggins, St. Luke's counsel asked about other 
medical conditions of Mrs. Hen-ett documented in her records without reference to the "chief 
complaint" or encephalomalacia. Tr. p. 598, LL. 22, p. 627, LL. 14. 
"It is usually a basic function of redirect examination to allow a witness to explain his 
testimony elicited on cross-examination." Sanville v. State, 593 P.2d 1340, 1344 (Wyo. 1979), 
citing State v. Price, 513 S.W.2d 392 (Mo. 1974); People v. Wesley, 18 Ill.2d 138, 163 N.E.2d 
500 (Ill. 1959); State v. Lillian, 180 Kan. 640, 305 P .2d 828 (Kan. 1957). "The opening of the 
door concept, however, reaches further and is an extension of that familiar rule. Succinctly stated, 
the "opening the door" rule is that a party who in some way permits the trial judge to let down 
the gates to a field of inquiry that is not competent but relevant cannot complain if his adversary 
is also allowed to avail himself of the opening within its scope." Id., Hobbs v. Ada County, 93 
Idaho 443,462 P.2d 742 (1969); U.S. v. Geller, 481 F.2d 275,276 (9th Cir. 1973). 
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Any claim of unfair surprise or prejudice rings hollow as it was St. Luke's that "opened 
the door" to this line of inquiry by its cross-examination of Dr. Wiggins. 
lz. Any error ill admitting tile testimony of Dr. Wiggins regarding 
enceplzalomalacia is lzarmless error 
I.R.E. 103(a) provides that "[e]rror may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or 
excludes evidence unless a substantial right of the party is affected." Similarly, I.R.C.P. 61 
provides that "[t]he court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or defect in 
the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties." This Court has 
repeatedly stated that "[i]ssues on appeal are not considered unless they are properly supported 
by both authority and argument." HF.LP., LLC v. City of Twin Falls, 157 Idaho 672, 686-87, 
339 P.3d 557, 571-72 (2014), citing Gem State Ins. Co. v. Hutchison, 145 Idaho 10, 16, 175 P.3d 
172, 178 (2007). "[A] party's failure to present some argument as to how the evidentiary ruling 
affected a substantial right is fatal to its evidentiary challenge and the Court deems the issue 
waived. Id, citing Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 18, 278 P.3d 415,420 (2012). 
Because an appellant can only prevail if the claimed error affected a substantial right, the 
appellant must present some argument that a substantial right was implicated." Id. 
Thus, "when appealing from an evidentiary ruling reviewed for abuse of discretion, the 
appellant must demonstrate both the trial court's abuse of discretion and that the e1Tor affected a 
substantial right." Id., citing Hurtado v. Land O'Lakes, Inc., 153 Idaho 13, 18,278 P.3d 415,420 
(2012), see also Goodspeed v. Shippen, 154 Idaho 866,870,303 P.3d 225,229 (2013); Akers v. 
D.L. White Const., Inc., 156 Idaho 37,320 P.3d 428,436 (2014). 
The record is devoid of any evidence that the jury did not consider the correct measure of 
damages in this case. St. Luke's merely invites this Court to engage in alternative fact-finding 
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rather than offer any proof of prejudice. 5 The record below is replete with evidence that Mrs. 
Berrett was completely debilitated by her stroke and that it necessitated her return to the hospital 
in September 2014. 
St. Luke's ignored that its own expert, Dr. Cox, testified that Mrs. Berrett suffered a 
terrible, catastrophic injury and would need in-home care for the rest of her life. Tr. p. 917, LL. 
12-21. Dr. Cox opined that the stroke deprived Mrs. Herrett of five years of life. Tr. p. 1057, LL. 
6 - p. 1058, LL. 8. St. Luke's has completely failed to demonstrate how the admission of Dr. 
Wiggins' testimony or the Court's refusal to grant a mistrial violated a substantial right. It points 
to no prejudice in admitting the testimony of Dr. Wiggins with respect to liability or the jury's 
finding of recklessness. St. Luke's fails to demonstrate any link between the presumably 
offensive testimony and the damages - economic or non-economic - in this case. 
i. St. Lukes' has not correctly assigned error to the Trial Courts' 
evidentiary ruling admitting the encephalomalacia testimony by Dr. 
Wiggins and thus has waived that issue 
As part of its argument on the mistrial issue, St. Luke's argues that the Trial Court failed 
to apply the proper legal standards in admitting Dr. Wiggins' redirect testimony the Friday 
before. App. Brief, 16. The arguments purportedly address the mistrial issue, but misstate and 
then challenge the Court's prior evidentiary ruling. Idaho App. R. 35(a)(6) states "The argument 
shall contain the contentions of the appellant with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the 
reasons therefor, with citations to authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and the record 
relied upon." 
As a threshold issue then, the Trial Court's decision to allow that evidence into the record 
in the first instance was not raised as an issue on appeal and thus is waived. "Where an appellant 
5 It must also be noted that St. Luke's failed to file a post-trial motion asking the district court to rule that the non-
economic awards were excessive. St. Luke's does not even attempt to argue excessiveness on appeal. 
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fails to assert his assignments of error with pa1iicularity and to supp01i his position with 
sufficient authority, those assignments of error are too indefinite to be heard by the Court." Bach 
v. Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 790, 229 P.3d 1146, 1152 (2010), citing Randall v. Ganz, 96 Idaho 
785, 788, 537 P.2d 65, 68 (1975). "This Court will not search the record on appeal for error." Id. 
Citing Suits v. Idaho Bd. of Prof! Discipline, 138 Idaho 397, 400, 64 P.3d 323, 326 (2003). 
Consequently, to the extent that an assignment of error is not argued and supported in 
compliance with the I.AR., it is deemed to be waived. Suitts v. Nix, 141 Idaho 706, 708, 117 
P.3d 120, 122 (2005). 
C. Any unfair prejudice was cured by the the testimony of Dr. Cox regarding 
encephalomalacia and by the stipulated fact presented to the jury 
I. St. Luke's was allowed to have Dr. Cox offer testimony about the 
encephalomalacia contained in the records, and he said the same thing as Dr. 
Wiggins 
St. Luke's also argues that it could not cure any harm done by Dr. Wiggins' testimony, 
even though the Comi allowed it to enquire of their own expe1i, Dr. Cox. Relying on the very 
same medical records as Dr. Wiggins, Dr. Cox said essentially the same thing when he described 
the encephalomalacia diagnosis as "the natural progression of what that brains looks like over 
time after someone has had a stroke" and "The encephalomalacia, ... is progressing along just 
as we would expect." Tr. p. 903, LL. 12 - p. 904, LL. 4 ( emphasis added). 
2. St. Luke's waived any objection to the admission of Dr. Wiggins' testimony 
regarding encephalomalacia when it stipulated to the Trial Court instructing the 
jury that Mrs. Berrett did not have "continuing brain deterioration" 
In order to make sure the jury was not mislead into thinking that the He1Tetts were 
claiming future damages as a result of continuing brain deterioration, St. Luke's stipulated that 
the Trial Court could instruct the jury as follows: 
I'm going to simply read this to you, but this is a piece of evidence, if you will. 
And it reads as follows: "The parties agree that it is a fact in this case that Joyce 
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Herrett does not have continuing brain deterioration from her stroke that occurred 
on December 24th, 2013. 
Tr. p. 1133, LL. 21 - p. 1134, LL. 6. 
Even assuming, arguendo, that allowing Dr. Wiggins' testimony regarding the 
encephalomalacia was error, such error was cured with that instruction to the jury. It essentially 
removed the issue from the jury's consideration. As this Court has stated, "We must keep in 
mind that error in the admission of evidence may be cured by proper instructions to the jury." 
Barry v. Arrow Transp. Co., 83 Idaho 41, 47,358 P.2d 1041, 1045 (1960), citing Smith v. Hines, 
33 Idaho 582, 196 P. 1032 (1921); Crossler v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 51 Idaho 413, 6 P.2d 151 
(1931). 
In the instant case, the Trial Court went out of its way to assuage St. Luke's argument that 
it was somehow unprepared to meet the encephalomalacia diagnosis as "ongoing" or 
"progressive" and St. Luke's has adduced no evidence that the judge abused his discretion in this 
regard or that the jury improperly considered any such evidence when it rendered its verdict. 
St. Luke's argument on appeal completely glosses over the fact that the question of 
whether the stroke was 'progressive' or 'ongoing' was taken from the jury by stipulation. "Error 
in admission of evidence may be cured by proper instruction, and it must be presumed that the 
jury obeyed the trial court's direction." Cookv. Skyline Corp., 135 Idaho 26, 32, 13 P.3d 857,863 
(2000), quoting State v. Tolman, 121 Idaho 899, 905-06 n.6, 828 P.2d 1304, 1310-11 n.6 (1992). 
D. The Trial Court properly allowed Dr. Goldstien's rebuttal testimony because it had 
been properly disclosed with the appropriate foundation 
I. The Trial Court has broad discretion and St. Luke's must demonstrate that a 
substantial right was affected by the admission of the evidence 
"Error may not be predicated upon a ruling which admits or excludes evidence unless the 
ruling is a manifest abuse of the trial court's discretion and a substantial right of the party is 
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affected." Ballard v. Kerr, 160 Idaho 674, 693, 378 P.3d 464,483 (2016). "Rebuttal evidence is 
evidence which explains, repels, counteracts, or disproves evidence which has been introduced 
by or on behalf of an adverse party." State v. Sorrell, 116 Idaho 966, 783 P.2d 305 (Ct. App. 
1989), citing State v. Olsen, 103 Idaho 278, 647 P.2d 734 (1982). There is no doubt that the trial 
court has "broad discretion" in evidentiary decisions, including whether to admit evidence in 
rebuttal. This is true even where the evidence is not strictly rebuttal in nature, its admission is 
within the sound discretion of the trial court, provided that the party against whom the evidence 
is admitted had the opportunity to meet the evidence. Id. 
The crux of St. Luke's argument is that Dr. Goldstein should not have been allowed to 
talk about a medical journal article presented in court by Dr. Shankland, St. Luke's nephrology 
expert. St. Luke's again argues that the Court abused its discretion but fails to argue exactly how 
- other than general reference to the discovery rules. It also fails to articulate how the admission 
of the testimony "prejudiced a substantial right." Ballard, 160 Idaho at 693,378 P.3d at 483. 
2. Dr. Goldstein's opinions that a reduced life expectancy could not be accurately 
determined simply based on Mrs. Herrett's preexisting kidney disease and the 
foundation for that was properly disclosed 
Dr. Goldstein is a nephrologist who reviewed Mrs. Herrett's medical records and offered 
opinions in this case as to whether Mrs. Herrett's underlying kidney disease adversely impacted 
her life expectancy. He was disclosed both as part of the Herrett's initial expert disclosures and 
as a rebuttal witness. R. pp. 59-62; pp. 248-263; pp. 955-957. The substance of Dr. Goldstein's 
disclosures span 20 pages (both disclosures) and take into account voluminous medical records 
in addition to the other foundation including, but not limited to, his experience, training, and 
knowledge ofnephrology. Id 
The error asserted by St. Luke's in this appeal is that Dr. Goldstein's opinions were not 
properly disclosed and the Trial Court erred in allowing him to testify on rebuttal. Dr. 
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Goldstein's opinions were outlined with the requisite specificity and with appropriate foundation 
based on the naiTow issue he was expected to testify to - whether, to a reasonable degree of 
medical certainty, Mrs. Herrett's life expectancy was reduced due to her preexisting kidney 
disease. There is no dispute that he was disclosed as holding the opinion that "to a high degree of 
medical certainty ... Joyce Herrett's life expectancy as of December 25, 2013, (the day following 
her air embolism) is not shortened consequent to her known, established and stable mild to 
moderate cln·onic kidney disease." R. p. 253. In response to Dr. Goldstein's disclosures, St. 
Luke's disclosed Dr. Stuart Shankland. R. pp. 495-509. Dr. Shankland held opinions that there 
would be a reduction in life expectancy. His disclosure included a general reference listing I 0 
articles and chapters from various medical treatises and publications. R. p. 508. The Herretts then 
supplemented Dr. Goldstein's disclosure with specific references to issues raised by Dr. 
Shankland and their areas of disagreement. R. pp. 955-957. More than 11 specific opinions that 
addressed Dr. Shankland's disclosure were identified in the supplement which included 
references to Dr. Shankland' s own materials. Id. 
At trial, the Herretts elected not to call Dr. Goldstein in their case in chief. During St. 
Luke's case, it called Dr. Shankland to offer his opinion that Mrs. Herrett had a reduced life 
expectancy of 5-7 years. Tr. p. 978, LL. 23 -p. 999, LL. 25. Much of the opinions that had been 
disclosed, were not elicited. In support of his opinion, Dr. Shankland discussed one particular 
article at length with references to charts within the study. Id. 
The Herretts called Dr. Goldstein to rebut Dr. Shankland's opinion regarding the reduced 
life expectancy. The argument on appeal is that Dr. Goldstein's disclosures did not rise to the 
level of specificity regarding his critique of Dr. Shankland's use of the aiiicle he discussed during 
his direct testimony. 
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3. The Trial Court con-ectly perceived the issue as one of discretion and exercised 
reason by hearing an offer of proof before allowing the testimony 
The Trial Comi was asked to rule on the admissibility of evidence throughout the trial. 
Both sides had objected to certain evidence being offered, including expert testimony for lack of 
disclosure. Addressing the latest objections raised on the issue with respect to Dr. Goldstein, the 
Court stated: 
With regard to number 7, which seems to be kind of the pivotal issue here, Dr. 
Shankland kept referencing an article that was -- I don't know even know what it 
was called. I think maybe he identified it, and I'm assuming that is the a1iicle 
that's going to be talked about on rebuttal. So obviously both paiiies know what 
that is. But I'm going to rule the same thing I kind of ruled the last time we had 
this issue. I can't rule on this motion until I hear the questions. So again, you need 
to be very specific with your questions, you need to be very specific with your 
objections. And instruct your witness, Mr. Whitehead, not to start volunteering 
information when there's an objection pending so I can rule on that. 
Tr. p. 1087, LL. 20 - p. 1088, LL. 9. 
The Court clearly understood the matter as one of discretion and thoughtfully considered 
the objection with regards to the circumstances he was confronted witl!. After an additional 
objection by St. Luke's, the Court took a recess to consider the issue again. Tr. p. 1093, LL. 24-
p. 1094, LL. 20. Upon returning to the courtroom, the Court made the following determination: 
The issue to the Court is not so much whether the opinion of Dr. Goldstein has 
been disclosed. I think it's very clear that his opinion is going to be that he 
disagrees with Dr. Shankland. Okay? The more precise issue is, why? And does 
that -- does this disclosure meet the facts and opinions as required by Rule 26? I 
don't know because I have no idea what he's going to say. So here's what we're 
going do. Mr. Whitehead, you make an offer of proof by exainining him, I guess 
we're going to, like, testify twice today maybe, and then I can find out exactly 
what he's going to say, and I will tell you whether I agree or disagree that he's 
within the scope of the disclosure. 
Tr. p. 1100, LL. 15 -p. 1101, LL. 1. 
An offer of proof was then presented to the Court for his consideration and Dr. Goldstein 
was allowed to testify consistent therewith. Tr. p. 1113, LL. 21 - p. 1118, LL. 4. The Trial Court 
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correctly concluded that the testimony was in reference to the medical journal already presented 
by St. Luke's witness and that his opinions were consistent with his pretrial disclosures. Tr. p. 
1110, LL. 16-23. The record demonstrates that Dr. Goldstein's opinions, and the basis therefore, 
were more than adequately disclosed prior to trial. The real crux of St. Luke's argument is that, 
despite only a general reference to the underlying ruiicles and treatises in Dr. Shankland' s 
disclosure, Dr. Goldstein should have provided specific, written criticisms of each and every 
article or treatise disclosed prior to Dr. Shankland even testifying. Just like the argument raised 
with respect to Dr. Wiggins' testimony on redirect, this argument presumes that Berretts' counsel 
or Dr. Goldstein could anticipate the level of detail Dr. Shankland would go into in his testimony 
with respect to the articles and treatises as support for his opinions. The logical extension of St. 
Luke's argument is that trial comis have no gatekeeper function or discretion with respect to the 
admission of evidence where I.R.C.P. 26(b )( 4) applies and that trials are just scripted affairs 
when it comes to presenting expe1is. 
4. Even assuming, arguendo, that admitting the rebuttal testimony by Dr. Goldstein 
was error, it was harmless given the undisputed causation and facts in this case 
regarding the catastrophic injuries suffered by Mrs. Berrett 
The standard for harmless error and I.R.C.P. 61 has been previously discussed and is well 
known by this Court. The record clearly establishes that the Trial Court carefully considered the 
offer of proof prior to Dr. Goldstein's testimony and made a reasoned judgment to allow the 
limited rebuttal provided. St. Luke's generally ascribes error by asking this court to review that 
decision without pointing to any specific prejudice or hrum. The disagreement between Dr. 
Shankland and Dr. Goldstein is not so wide as St. Luke's suggests and there is no evidence or 
argument that Dr. Goldstein's short rebuttal prejudiced St. Luke's or impacted the jury's verdict 
in any way. Even Dr. Shankland testified that no one can say when Mrs. Berrett will die, that 
good medical care would extend Mrs. Berrett's life expectancy, and that the article in question 
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was based on people who developed heart disease - something he acknowledged Mrs. Herrett 
had no clinical signs of. Tr. p. 985, LL. 24 - p. 986, LL. 102, Tr. p. 987, LL. 15-20, Tr. p. 998, 
LL. 21. 
The argument asserted is one based on a perceived lack of technical compliance with 
I.R.C.P. 26(b)(4) rather than any surprise or lack of ability to meet the proffered testimony. St, 
Luke's failure to articulate the substantial right that has been affected or any prejudice with 
respect to the testimony at issue amounts to harmless error and/or waiver of that issue on appeal. 
E. The reckless jury instruction was a correct statement of the law and appropriately 
given under the facts of this case 
St. Luke's frames this issue purely as: "The Trial Court failed, as a matter of law, to 
properly instruct the jury on the correct legal definition ofrecklessness." App. Brief, pp. 34, 38. 
I. The standard of review for this issue is de nova and, where the appropriateness of 
giving the instruction in the first instance is not at issue, the review is limited to 
whether the instructions, as a whole, correctly state the law 
This Court exercises free review over the propriety of jury instructions. Hennefer v. 
Blaine Cty. Sch. Dist., 158 Idaho 242, 253, 346 PJd 259, 270 (2015), reh'g denied (Apr. 23, 
2015), citing Mackay v. Four Rivers Packing Co., 151 Idaho 388,391,257 PJd 755, 758 (2011). 
"If the instructions as a whole, and not individually, fairly and adequately present the issues and 
state the applicable law then no reversible error is committed." Clark v. Klein, 137 Idaho 154, 
159, 45 P.3d 810, 815 (2002), citing Sherwood v. Carter, 119 Idaho 246,256, 805 P.2d 452,462 
(1991). "The burden is on the appellant to show prejudicial error from an erroneous jury 
instruction, and it must be clearly shown." Clark, 137 Idaho 154, 159, 45 P.3d 810, 815 (2002), 
citing Burgess v. Salmon River Canal Co., 119 Idaho 299, 306, 805 P.2d 1223, 1230 (1991). 
"Reversible error only occurs when an instruction misleads the jury or prejudices a party." 
Manning v. Twin Falls Clinic & Hosp., Inc., 122 Idaho 47, 51, 830 P.2d 1185, 1189 (1992), 
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citing Salinas v. Vierstra, 107 Idaho 984,695 P.2d 369 (1985). 
2. The district court's instruction on recklessness followed the standard set forth in 
the recent Henne-fer decision and is a conect statement of the law 
The jmy instruction given at trial, 11.3, provided the following definition ofrecklessness: 
Conduct is reckless when a person makes a conscious choice as to his or her 
course of action under circumstances where the person knew or should have 
known that such action created a high probability that harm would actually result. 
The term reckless does not require an intent to cause harm. Reckless means more 
than ordinary negligence. 
R. p. 1177. The instruction given contains all of the elements of recklessness identified by this 
Court necessary to correctly state the law. 
a. The correct standard for recklessness that applies under Idaho Code§ 6-
1603 is an objective, not subjective, standard. 
In Hennefer, this Court articulated the conect standard for recklessness in cases applying 
LC. §6-1603. 158 Idaho 242, 248-49, 346 P.3d 259, 265-66 (2015), reh'g denied (Apr. 23, 
2015). An "objective" standard means that an actor "should have known" their conduct posed a 
high probability of harm. Id. The conect standard is: 
Though the actor must make a conscious choice as to his or her course of action, 
the actor need not subjectively be actually aware of the risk or the high probability 
that harm will result. It is sufficient for a finding of recklessness that the actor 
makes the choice as to his or her course of conduct under circumstances where 
the risk and high probability of harm are objectively foreseeable. 
Id. ( emphasis added). 
The language used in instruction 11.3 follows the standard set forth in Hennefer and 
incorporates the requirement that the actor needs to make a conscious choice: "Conduct is 
reckless when a person makes a conscious choice as to his or her course of action." R. p. 1177. It 
properly identified the objective standard: "under circumstances where the person knew or 
should have known .... " Id. It properly linked the actor's choice with the high risk of harm: "that 
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such action created a high probability that harm would actually result." Id. The instruction also, 
consistent with Henne/er, instructed the jury that "[t]he term reckless does not require an intent 
to cause harm." Id. 
The defendant in Hennefer, argued that "the correct standard involves an analysis of only 
the actor's subjective knowledge of a risk, subjective knowledge of the high probability that harm 
will result from that risk, and a conscious decision to proceed with the course of action despite 
that risk." 158 Idaho at 248, 346 P.3d at 265. In this appeal, St. Luke's similarly argues for a 
more subjective reckless standard with respect to 'intent.' It argues, "[t]he description of the type 
of harm that might have occurred and the intentional nature of the behavior are critical pieces of 
the definition of recklessness." App. Brief, p. 37. St. Luke's argues that instruction 11.3 "could 
clearly leave the jury with the impression that they need not judge the quality of risk assumed, 
and that the Herretts must simply prove that Nurse Wentz took this action after thinking about 
what should be done." App. Brief, pp. 36-37. 
This argument, taken as a whole, is nonsensical and merely restates the idea that some 
kind of 'subjective' intent is required related to the "type" of harm suffered. There is no legal 
justification for that proposition. The objective standard articulated in Henne/er makes perfect 
sense because requiring actual intent to cause harm amounts to requiring the commission of a 
criminal act in order to find recklessness under LC. §6-1603. Nothing in the statute, IDJI or the 
applicable case law imposes such a requirement. 
3. The facts in this case overwhelmingly supported the jury's finding of recklessness 
and St. Luke's has failed to demonstrate any prejudicial error m giving the 
instruction, thus it was harmless 
St. Luke's notes that their objection below was that "recklessness was not appropriate in 
this case." App. Brief, p. 34. The evidence in this case overwhelmingly supported the jury's 
conclusion that the hospital was reckless in causing Mrs. Herrett's stroke. Throughout its appeal, 
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St. Luke's attempts to downplay the seriousness of the stroke and repeatedly ignores the myriad 
evidence that was introduced in this case that supported a finding of reckless conduct by the jury. 
The evidence at trial was that Nurse Wentz was unfamiliar and untrained in the 
procedure, that she failed to consult the policy prior to attempting the procedure, and that she 
asked another nurse for assistance without success. Tr. p. 439 - p. 440, LL. 21. Nurse Wentz 
testified that she knew a stroke could result. Tr. p. 44 7, LL. 19. Despite this, Nurse Wentz 
attempted the procedure anyway. Tr. p. 446, LL. 18. Nurse Sheila Dutt contradicted Nurse 
Wentz' testimony that Nurse Wentz had asked her for help or informed her that she had never 
removed a CVC before. Tr. p. 490, LL. 1-22. Like Wentz, she agreed that removal ofa CVC is a 
"high risk" procedure with risks of stroke. Tr. pp. 487, LL. 8 - p. 488, LL. 21. She agreed that it 
would be "unthinkable" to ignore Wentz's request for help in removing the CVC. Id. Nurse 
Dutt's testimony clearly demonstrated that Nurse Wentz' conduct was not consistent with even 
minimum competency expected of a registered nurse. Tr. p. 489, LL. 9 - p. 490, LL. 23. Finally, 
there was uncontradicted testimony by the Herretts' expert nurse that the removal of the CVC in 
this case was "reckless." Tr. p. 517, LL. 5-16. 
St. Luke's assignment of error with respect to the instruction cannot be supported because 
it cannot show any prejudice given the undisputed facts at trial, and thus giving the instruction 
was harmless. 
4. St. Luke's misstates the Trial Comt's legal analysis for giving the instruction 
Even if it were relevant to this Court's inquiry, (it isn't), St. Luke's misstates the Trial 
Court's reasons for overruling the objection to the instruction 11.3. The Trial Court clearly 
understood the legal standard when it stated: 
The instructions from our supreme court to trial comts are that we should use 
ICJI6 instructions unless there's a good reason otherwise. I think that's the general 
6 The transcript on appeal mistakenly references the "ICJI" rather than the "IDJI" discussed by the Trial Court and 
the parties below. 
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standard. The Court is familiar with Hennefer, and there's no doubt in my mind 
that this language is taken out of Hennefer, the language in 11.3 is taken out of 
Hennefer. I think it's an appropriate statement of law. I'm going to deviate from 
the ICJI instruction. There's nothing wrong with the ICJI instruction, I just think 
Hennefer -- well, I think this instruction is better. I will add one sentence to it at 
the stout opposition of the plaintiffs, and that will be at the very end: "Reckless 
means more than ordinary negligence." I specifically took out the definition of 
negligence that was requested because I don't see that has anything to do with this 
case. It's been admitted. So that's why it does not appear in the instructions 
because we're not - I'll just leave it at that. But your objection for the record is 
noted. Do you have any other objections to the proposed instructions? 
Tr. p. 1144, LL. 6-25. 
5. Any error or defect in the instruction with respect to defining "negligence" was 
invited by St. Luke's because it stipulated to not giving the definition of 
negligence to the jury 
Idaho law is well established that "one may not successfully complain of errors one has 
consented to or acquiesced in. In other words, invited errors are not reversible." State v. Caudill, 
109 Idaho 222,226, 706 P.2d 456,460 (1985), citing State v. Owsley, 105 Idaho 836 (1983). 
St. Luke's attempts to bolster its arguments with respect to instruction 11.3 by arguing 
that a jury question during deliberations "makes it apparent" that a "more accurate" definition 
was needed. App. Brief, p. 39. The problem with this argument is that St. Luke's agreed at the 
time not to give any additional instruction to the jury regarding the definition of negligence 
versus recklessness. Tr. p. 1233, LL. 23 - p. 1234, LL. 6. It had a chance to clear that up and 
didn't. If the crux of St. Luke's argument with respect to misleading this jury about the 
difference between recklessness and mere negligence is the jury was not told what mere 
negligence was, St. Luke's invited that error. 
F. The district court did not abuse its discretion in determining the Herretts' life care 
expert bad the proper foundation to testify 
Prior to trial, the Herretts timely disclosed Debra DeMint-Lee, RN, CCM, CDMS as a life 
care planning expert. R. pp. 54-75. St. Luke's argues that Ms. DeMint-Lee lacked the appropriate 
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foundation to testify as to future medical costs of Mrs. Herrett. In making this argument, St. 
Luke's fails to specifically identify which opinions it finds objectionable. St. Luke's intentionally 
omits relevant facts and information about Ms. DeMint-Lee's expertise and foundation relied 
upon. St. Luke's further misstates and misconstrues the law regarding the necessary medical 
foundation for a life care planner. 
I. Legal standard for expert testimony 
In Idaho, the admission of expert testimony is governed by I.R.E. 701 and I.R.E. 702 
which state, respectively: 
Testimony by experts: 
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact 
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified as an 
expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education, may testify thereto 
in the form of an opinion or otherwise. 
Basis of opinion testimony by experts: 
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or 
inference may be those perceived by or made known to the expert at or before the 
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the paiiicular field in 
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be 
admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be admitted. Facts 
or data that are otherwise inadmissible shall not be disclosed to the jury by the 
proponent of the opinion or inference unless the court determines that their 
probative value in assisting the jury to evaluate the expert's opinion substantially 
outweighs their prejudicial effect. 
I.R.E. 702; I.R.E. 703.7 
The standard of review for this evidentiary issue is known to this Court and discussed 
previously in this brief. St. Luke's has the burden of showing that the Trial Court abused its 
discretion in admitting Ms. DeMint-Lee's testimony. It falsely argues that the Trial Court failed 
to focus on "medical foundation" when it considered the evidence of Ms. DeMint-Lee's 
qualifications as an expert. In fact, the Trial Court demonstrably exercised its discretion when 
7 
St. Luke's fails to cite to these Rules in connection with its argument concerning Ms. DeMint-Lee. 
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allowing the testimony in light of the foundation supplied (See #4, below) and its conclusions 
that the undisputed nature of the injuries coupled with Mr. Herrett's own observations would 
suffice. The Trial Court stated: 
With regard to the medical foundation issue, I would agree that in the normal type 
of case that you would certainly need medical opinion to support a life care 
planner's ultimate conclusions. This is not the normal case. I think that if all we 
had in this case was Mr. Herrett's testimony that "I've lived with my wife for 32 
years. I know what she can do, what she couldn't do before this stroke, and she 
can't be left alone because she does strange things, she needs help bathing, she 
has problems with her ostomy bags, she can't cook, I mean, frankly, that is 
enough, in and of itself to submit a-to make the argument, support the argument 
that she needs extended life care assistance. Now whether that's credible to the 
jury or not, whether it's all necessary, again, is a factual question, but to say that 
there's no evidence to support that, I just don't agree with that. 
Tr. p. 814, LL. 16 - p. 815, LL. 5. This is consistent with applicable legal principles and 
demonstrates a reasoned decision in light of all of the evidence. 
2. St. Luke's general objections on appeal constitute a waiver of this issue. 
St. Luke's argues in this appeal that the Trial Court abused its discretion in finding that 
Ms. DeMint-Lee had the appropriate medical foundation to form the basis of her opinions. 
Despite the extensive qualifications and substantial foundational evidence, St. Luke's 
makes only broad and vague objections to the testimony of Ms. DeMint-Lee. St. Luke's fails to 
adequately specify what specific opinion elicited at trial lacked foundation.8 Ms. DeMint-Lee 
offered many opinions at trial. St. Luke's raised objections to some, but not others. In this appeal, 
St. Luke's does not state with particularity which opinions it contends were improperly admitted. 
The Herretts are thus "left to guess" as to the objection raised by St. Luke's. As a result of this 
defect, this Court should find that St. Luke's has simply waived any objection to the testimony or 
opinions of Ms. DeMint-Lee. 
8 For instance, St. Luke's failed to point to any medical procedure, service or device testified to by Ms. DeMint-Lee 
that could only be prescribed by a physician. 
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3. Ms. DeMint-Lee is more than qualified to present life care plans as an expert 
pursuant to Idaho Rule of Evidence 702 
Ms. DeMint-Lee is a registered nurse (RN) licensed in Idaho, Oregon, Montana, and 
Arizona. Tr. p. 652, LL. 17-25. She also has a master's degree in vocational rehab counseling and 
a bachelor's degree in business management. Tr. p. 652, LL. 11-15. She is certified as a 
vocational rehabilitation counselor and carries credentials for case management certification. Tr. 
p. 652, LL. 6-20. Ms. DeMint-Lee has nearly thirty years of experience in the health care field. 
Tr. p. 653, LL. 10-13. She has completed more than fifty full life care plans and too many 
treatment plans to count. Tr. p. 654, LL. 18-22. Further, Ms. DeMint-Lee manages three clinics 
as a registered nurse, including the Veteran's Administration in Caldwell, Idaho. As part of her 
duties, she participates in patient care and rehabilitation of elderly patients. Tr. p. 652, LL. 2-10. 
4. Ms. DeMint-Lee had the requisite foundation for her opinions pursuant to Idaho 
Rule of Evidence 703 
In performing her duties as a life care planning expert, Ms. DeMint-Lee typically relies 
upon information gathered from medical records, information gathered from the patient, 
information gathered from medical professionals, as well as research into costing of services and 
items. Tr. p. 654, LL. 10-17. This is usual and customary in the industry for life care planners 
such as Ms. DeMint-Lee. Tr. p. 654. 
In this case, Ms. DeMint-Lee gathered information directly from Mr. and Mrs. Berrett. 
Tr. p. 655, LL. 16-25. This included in person visits in their home as well as conversations on the 
telephone. Id. This allowed her to assess Mrs. Herrett's ability to function in the home and in 
society. Tr. p. 662, LL. 5-15. Based on her observations and interviews, Ms. DeMint-Lee 
testified as follows: 
So her physical impairments are pretty obvious. With her right arm, she has 
weakness, she has contractures of that hand at the elbow and wrist. She has an 
unsteady gait with mobility. She has - she's at risk for falls as a result of that. She 
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has difficulty caring for, completing things like activities of daily living, 
showering independent, grooming independently, dressing. She can dress-she 
does as much for herself as she possibly can. She tries to dress the top of her body 
with short sleeve shirts, she's able to accomplish that. Pants are-she cannot do. 
Socks are very difficult with one hand, and it is her nondominant hand that she 
primarily has to use, but she uses-so that makes it difficult to do some of these 
tasks that she otherwise would. 
Tr. p. 665, LL. 23 -p. 666, LL. 10. 
Ms. DeMint-Lee also provided costing for medical services and medical devices. To 
obtain these costs, Ms. DeMint-Lee contacted providers who were located in Twin Falls, Idaho. 
Tr. p. 671, LL. 4-11; p. 680, LL. 21-25. As part of her foundation, Ms. DeMint-Lee reviewed the 
records of Mrs. Herrett's treating physician, Dr. Laucius. Tr. p. 709, LL. 15-23. She reviewed the 
records of Mrs. Herrett's treating nephrologist, Dr. Narasimhan. Tr. p. 710, LL. 15-25. 
Ms. DeMint Lee also spoke to Dr. Calhoun, Mrs. Henett's neuropsychologist, who 
determined that it is unsafe for Mrs. Herrett to be left home alone. Tr. p. 690, LL. 19-24. They 
discussed in-home care needs for Mrs. Herrett and what would be reasonable. Tr. p. 691, LL. 14-
20. In addition to her own observations, Ms. DeMint-Lee based her recommendations for 
cognitive behavioral therapy and twenty-four hour in-home care on the recommendations of Dr. 
Calhoun. Tr. p. 679, LL. 21 - p. 680, LL. 11; p. 690, LL. 16 - p. 691, LL. 20. 
Ms. DeMint-Lee consulted and had the life care plan approved by Ms. Deringer, a nurse 
practitioner. Tr. p. 669, LL. 9-18. Ms. Deringer9 worked for the VA clinic managed by Ms. 
DeMint-Lee. Tr. p. 669, LL. 19-22. As a nurse practitioner, Ms. Deringer is able to independently 
assess, diagnose and treat patients. Tr. p. 670, LL. 9-11. Ms. Deringer prepared the treatment plan 
in concert with Ms. DeMint-Lee. Tr. p. 704, LL. 9-16. In doing so, Ms. Deringer reviewed the 
9 St. Luke's incorrectly argues that Ms. Deringer lacks foundation to opine as to the "costs" in this case because she 
lives in Arizona, not Idaho. App. Brief, p. 43. St. Luke's provides no authority for this position. Moreover, St. 
Luke's omits the fact that Ms. Deringer was providing foundation for appropriateness of care, not costs, and only 
moved to Arizona just prior to trial. Tr. p. 669, LL. 19 -p. 670, LL. 2. St. Luke's adduced no evidence that Ms. 
DeMint-Lee used costing figures from Arizona. 
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medical records, reviewed the treatment plan "line by line" and approved it. 10 Tr. p. 17-21. She 
provided recommendations, based on her expertise and the medical records, for occupational and 
physical therapies. Tr. p. 675, LL. 1 -p. 678, LL. 24. 
With respect to the duration of the plan, Mrs. DeMint-Lee consulted standard life 
expectancy tables from the Centers for Disease Control and Statistics. Tr. p. 695, LL. 4-21. 
Again, St. Luke's own expert testified that using these tables is "standard in the industry." Tr. p. 
1034, LL. 17-22. Ms. DeMint-Lee went further and consulted with a gynecologist, a 
nephrologist, and a nurse practitioner to address the effect of Mrs. He1Tett' s preexisting medical 
conditions on her life expectancy. Id. None of the medical professionals could say within a 
reasonable degree of certainty that there would be an adverse effect on her life expectancy. Tr. p. 
695, LL. 22-25. Thus, ample foundation was provided regarding the duration of the plan. 
Given the breadth of foundation provided at trial, St. Luke's simply cannot demonstrate 
that the Trial Court abused its discretion by finding that Ms. DeMint-Lee had adequate 
foundation for her opinions. 
5. The cases cited by St. Luke's confirm that Ms. DeMint-Lee possessed adeguate 
foundation for her opinions 
The cases cited by St. Luke's are either factually distinguishable from this case, or are 
misapplied. For example, St. Luke's argues that Hogland v. Town & Counhy Grocer of 
Fredicktown Mo., Inc. 2015 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 80493 (E.D. Ark. 2015) supports its argument that 
Ms. DeMint-Lee lacked foundation for her treatment plan. In Hogland, the court specifically 
found that a neuropsychologist is qualified to render opinions regarding the need for in-home 
care and that such opinions can be the foundation for a life care plan. Id. at 64. In this case, it is 
undisputed that Ms. DeMint-Lee explicitly took into account the recommendation of twenty four 
10 The "rules of evidence explicitly permit experts to base their opinions on evidence that may not be admissible." 
Hofferv. Shappard, 160 Idaho 868,881,380 P.3d 681,694 (2016)(cilingl.R.E. 703). 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF - 38 
hour care from Mrs. Herrett's neuropsychologist Dr. Calhoun. Tr. p. 707, LL. 8 - p. 708, LL. 20. 
St. Luke's fails to point out these facts and conclusions from Hogland in an attempt to twist the 
holding in its favor. 
St. Luke's cites State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Long, 189 So.3d 335, 338-39 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 2016) for the proposition that "only a doctor can decide what future medical treatment 
is necessary." App. Brief, p. 44. The ruling in that case is not nearly as broad as St. Luke's asserts 
it to be. That case found only that a physician's assistant was not qualified to opine as to the need 
for a future surgery. Long, 189 So.3d at 338. Ms. Deringer is a nurse practitioner, who specializes 
in rehabilitation. There is no evidence that she recommended any future surgery. She did not 
recommend any future care outside of her expertise. 11 
Another case cited by St. Luke's confirms that a life care plarming expert may establish 
foundation through physician reports, consultations, the life care planner's own findings, and the 
testimony of the injured party and their family. Cooper v. Bouchard Transp., 140 So.3d 1, 7-10 
(2013). That is entirely consistent with the foundation Mr. DeMint-Lee relied upon. 
That case also cites to authority that life care planners can rely upon statements from the 
injured and their family, especially when the injuries are well documented and the need for future 
care is obvious. Id., citing Robin v. Allstate, 889 So.2d 450 (2004). This is consistent with the 
findings and observations of the trial court in this case. Tr. p. 814, LL. 16-p. 815, LL. 5. 
With respect to the issue of lay testimony on causation, St. Luke's erroneously states that 
Evans v. Twin Falls County stands for the proposition that lay opinion is never inadmissible to 
prove medical causation. App. Brief, p. 45, citing 118 Idaho 210, 796 P .2d 87 (1990). This Court 
in Evans merely held that a lay witness could not testify to the cause of a heart attack that 
occurred eleven months after the complained of event. Id. Whether lay witness testimony is 
11 Again, St. Luke's fails to specifically articulate what portion of the plan they believe lacks adequate foundation. 
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admissible to prove causation is governed by I.R.E. 70 I and 702. Sheridan v. St. Luke's Regional 
Medical Center, 135 Idaho 775, 785, 25 P.3d 88 (2001). 
Foundation can be established in multiple ways, depending upon the case. Expert 
testimony is not even required in all cases. See Id. St. Luke's has failed to establish that the trial 
court abused its discretion in finding that Ms. DeMint-Lee established proper foundation. 
6. The undisputed proof at trial was that Mrs. Herrett suffered a debilitating stroke 
that left her needing in-home care for the rest of her life and thus any error in 
admitting the testimony was harmless 
As demonstrated throughout this brief, the important facts of this case are not largely in 
dispute. St. Luke's has admitted liability and a breach of the standard of care for its nurse causing 
Mrs. Herrett's stroke. There is undisputed evidence of reckless conduct. St. Luke's own 
witnesses said that Mrs. Herrett needs in-home care for at least 12 hours a day. Tr. 893, LL. 19-
25 - p. 894, LL. 1-14. The costing by Ms. Dunlap in that regard was substantially similar to Ms. 
DeMint-Lee's. 
In arguing that Ms. DeMint-Lee did not have proper foundation for her testimony, St. 
Luke's fails to argue how the admission of this evidence affected a substantial right where the 
undisputed evidence supports the jury's award, and thus any error was harmless. 
7. St. Luke's request for remittitur is waived 
For the first time on appeal, St. Luke's requests a remittitur. App. Brief, p. 45. St. Luke's 
failed to request a remitter of the future medical care costs pursuant to I.R.C.P. 59.1 at the district 
comi level. The issue of remittitur was waived as it is presented for the first time on appeal. See 
Kinsela v. State Dep't of Finance, 117 Idaho 632,634, 790 P.2d 1388, 1390 (1990). 
G. This Court should award attorney's fees and costs pursuant to § 12-121 as this 
appeal is frivolous, unreasonable and without foundation 
Idaho Code § 12-121 permits this Comi to award "reasonable attorney's fees to the 
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prevailing party." The Court will award fees if it determines "the action was brought or pursued 
frivolously, unreasonably, or without foundation." Ballard v. Kerr, 160 Idaho 674, 720, 378 P.3d 
464, 510 (2016); Turner v. Turner, 155 Idaho 819, 827, 317 P.3d 716, 724 (2013); Baker v. 
Sullivan, 132 Idaho 746, 751, 979 P.2d 619, 624 (1999). When an appellant fails to present a 
cogent argument as to why he should prevail, an award to his opponent is appropriate. Turner, 
155 Idaho at 827,317 P.3d at 724; Chicoine v. Bignall, 127 Idaho 225,228,899 P.2d 438,441 
(1995). 
This Court has repeatedly stated "[w]here issues of discretion are involved, an award of 
attorney fees is proper if the appellant fails to make a cogent challenge to the judge's exercise of 
discretion." J-U-B Engineers, Inc. v. Sec. Ins. Co. of Hartford, 146 Idaho 311,318,193 P.3d 858, 
865 (2008); Utter v. Gibbins, 137 Idaho 361, 367, 48 P.3d 1250, 1256 (2002), quoting Andrews 
v. Idaho Forest Indus., Inc., 117 Idaho 195, 197, 786 P.2d 586,589 (Ct.App.1990). Likewise, an 
award of attorney fees under this statute is appropriate if the appeal simply invites this Court "to 
second-guess the trial court on conflicting evidence." Turner, 155 Idaho at 827,317 P.3d at 724; 
Hoggv. Wolske, 142 Idaho 549,559, 130 P.3d 1087, 1097 (2006). 
St. Luke's has demonstrably failed to raise a proper issue on appeal. It simply asks this 
court to substitute its discretion for that of the Trial Court and jury. It fails to link up any of the 
purported errors complained of with a violation of a substantial right or prejudice. It consistently 
misstates the applicable law, the Trial Court's findings below, and the evidence presented at trial 
that contradicts its tainted view of the harm it did to Mrs. Herrett. The arguments raised by St. 
Luke's cherry-picks references to the record and ignores their own experts and witnesses with 
respect to the issues raised. The evidentiary rulings and the denial of the motion for mistrial were 
matters determined in the exercise of discretion by the Trial Court. The instruction given was not 
clearly erroneous and correctly applied the objective standard for recklessness and St. Luke's 
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invited the error complained of. This is a frivolous appeal, and the Herretts are entitled to 
attorney's fees. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The Herretts respectfully ask that this Court affirm the judgment entered in this case and 
award attorney's fees and costs in defending this appeal. 
DATED this 16th day of May, 2017. 
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